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Abstract
Background: Health economic analysis aimed at informing policy makers and supporting resource
allocation decisions has to evaluate not only improvements in health but also avoided decline. Little
is known however, whether the "direction" in which changes in health are experienced is important
for the public in prioritizing among patients. This experimental study investigates the social value
people place on avoiding (further) health decline when directly compared to curative treatments
in resource allocation decisions.
Methods: 127 individuals completed an interactive survey that was published in the World Wide
Web. They were confronted with a standard gamble (SG) and three person trade-off tasks, either
comparing improvements in health (PTO-Up), avoided decline (PTO-Down), or both, contrasting
health changes of equal magnitude differing in the direction in which they are experienced (PTO-
WAD). Finally, a direct priority ranking of various interventions was obtained.
Results: Participants strongly prioritized improving patients' health rather than avoiding decline.
The mean substitution rate between health improvements and avoided decline (WAD) ranged
between 0.47 and 0.64 dependent on the intervention. Weighting PTO values according to the
direction in which changes in health are experienced improved their accuracy in predicting a direct
prioritization ranking. Health state utilities obtained by the standard gamble method seem not to
reflect social values in resource allocation contexts.
Conclusion: Results suggest that the utility of being cured of a given health state might not be a
good approximation for the societal value of avoiding this health state, especially in cases of
competition between preventive and curative interventions.
Background
In the era of aging populations and rising incidence of
progressive diseases in industrialized countries, health
politicians in these countries are increasingly faced with
the decision what fraction of their budgets to spend on
treatment and cure or on avoiding (further) health de-
cline. Therefore, health economic analysis aimed at in-
forming policy makers and supporting resource allocation
decisions has to evaluate not only improvements in
health but also prevented decline. The benefit of these
"upward-movements" on a health scale compared to
avoided "downward-movements" is often calculated as
the potential gain in QALYs ("quality-adjusted life
years"). Traditionally the standard gamble (SG) or the
time trade-off (TTO) method is used to determine the
quality of life weights needed to estimate the benefit of
Published: 5 March 2002
BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2:3
Received: 11 November 2001
Accepted: 5 March 2002
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
© 2002 Schwappach; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. Verbatim copying and redistribution of this article are permitted in any medium for any purpose, provided 
this notice is preserved along with the article's original URL.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
Page 2 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
healthcare interventions in terms of QALYs. The use of
these techniques in resource allocation decisions has been
criticized as of two concerns, among others [1,2]. First, be-
cause the benefit of an intervention is calculated as the dif-
ference in preferences for two health states initially valued
isolated from each other [3,4]. The second concern is that
the use of SG and TTO in policy decisions assumes that
preferences an individual has regarding his own (hypo-
thetical) health equal the preferences this individual has
for the health of others, therefore being unaffected by dis-
tributional concerns [5,6]. Consequently, the person
trade-off (PTO) method has been proposed because it
forces respondents to take a social rather than a personal
perspective in evaluating rationing frameworks [7]. As in
the PTO movements on a health scale rather than distinct
health states are presented, and it thus explicitly focuses on
changes in health, the PTO seems to capture some of the
factors that researchers have found to be important for the
public in distributive decisions. Two of these are the sever-
ity of the initial health state and the potential for health
[8–10]. The former describes the tendency to give priority
to the worst off even if the associated health gain is small-
er. The latter describes the aversion to discriminate against
those with a limited potential for health as of chronic con-
ditions or disabilities.
This experimental study addresses a different factor influ-
encing distributional concerns of the public, that is, the di-
rection of a change in health. In health economic
evaluative studies the benefit of avoiding a health state is
traditionally calculated exactly as the inverse equivalent of
illness, and therefore – on a conceptual level – as the same
as cure or treatment. This may be of special relevance to
the evaluation of prevention programs, where benefit is
derived from reducing the likelihood of a specific health
state thought to occur in the future. However, despite the
effect of the direction of changes in health itself, i.e.,
avoided losses versus improvements, 'prevention', as the
term is commonly being used, also involves preferences
towards time and uncertainty. This study focuses only on
the equivalence of equally sized health effects achieved ei-
ther by curative or preventive treatments, ignoring risk
aversion and discounting of time effects. Imagine, for ex-
ample, illness X with an associated health state x (which is
worse than the top anchor 'perfect health'). If there is a
cure for X that will return diseased persons to perfect
health, the benefit of cure is 1-x, assuming the conven-
tional 0 to 1 utility scale and not taking the duration of ill-
ness into account. In case there is also the opportunity to
avert X in people healthy at present, the benefit of avoid-
ing health state x is also given by 1-x. The value people at-
tached to a move from a health state worse than perfect
health upwards is used interchangeably with the value of
avoiding a move from perfect health downwards this
health state. The underlying hypothesis is that the distance
between two health states is the main carrier of value irre-
spectively of the direction of the movement and the mode
by which it is achieved. This common method of benefit
estimation has been applied to various prophylactic treat-
ments and cost-per-QALY-estimates of avoiding health
decline are compared not only to treatment of the disease
under study but also to treatments of other diseases in
cost-utility-ratio league tables [11].
However, there is very limited evidence on the value peo-
ple attach to treatment and avoided decline when in-
volved gains and losses are directly compared to each
other in resource allocation contexts. If it was the case that
the distance between two health states is perceived as be-
ing of equal value no matter whether this distance is pre-
vented downwards or gained upwards, one would expect
that people reveal answers close to "100" when faced with
a PTO question like:
"In how many people a decline to health state X had to be pre-
vented to make you indifferent to treating 100 persons in health
state X and returning them to complete health"?
The available evidence and a number of rationales cast
doubts on the hypothesis that curative and protective in-
terventions would be valued as equivalents. Ubel et al.
surveyed 289 prospective jurors in the US how to allocate
funds on different healthcare projects for nursing home
residents with varying levels of disability [12]. Healthcare
activities were described as having the same magnitude of
benefit either by improving the level of functioning or
preventing further decline. While there was a general atti-
tude towards prevention, when the strength of preference,
measured on a five-point scale, was taken into account,
there was no statistically significant preference in favor of
prevention. In a survey conducted among the Swedish
general public, participants were asked to trade-off the
value of different programs saving varying numbers of
lives either by acute or by preventive care [13]. Again, re-
sponders favored prevention over acute care with a mean
of 1.2–1.4 lives saved by acute care being judged equiva-
lent to 1 life saved by preventive care. Overall, there seems
to be, if at all, a slight trend to prioritize towards preven-
tive health care. Both surveys presented choices among
certain outcomes close in time, thereby focusing mode of
intervention and the direction, in which changes in health
are achieved.
There are a number of rationales for people expressing dif-
fering values for cure and avoidance of decline. As Johan-
nesson and Johansson point out, giving priority to those
in a state worse than perfect health already suffering from
disease, may be explained by equity concerns [13]: Refus-
ing treatment to individuals in a more severe initial health
state and prioritizing those fortune to be healthy might beBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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judged as unfair and people might therefore place more
value on cure. Instead, one could argue that persons
healthy at the moment experience a loss when they fall
sick, while those presently suffering already have gone
through that loss. The disutility of the process of loss itself
might be considered more important than the process of
gain itself, i.e., recurring to health. One could see parallels
to the observation that patients often attach higher values
to the health state they are experiencing than the general
public [14]. If subjects in impersonal allocation tasks
would simultaneously adopt both perspectives, this could
explain that a greater value would be attached to avoiding
decline as compared to treatment since healthy subjects
obviously "lose more" than patients win. In addition, sub-
jects saved from developing a disease or decline might be
expected to live longer or in overall better quality of life,
and interventions for avoidance of disease might be per-
ceived as less harmful or more effective.
There are also a number of psychological explanations
why people would prioritize preventing decline compared
to cure, for example, as of an impersonal equivalent to
"status quo"- and "endowment"-effects [15]. Simply
speaking, opting for protective treatments would keep the
current situation unchanged for both the ill and the
healthy. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate
the value people place on equidistant health changes, ei-
ther achieved by preventive or curative care, when directly
compared in resource allocation decisions. A valuation
method that captures this relationship best is to be identi-
fied. In addition to the common PTO technique, two new
PTO frames will be applied which explicitly ask for the
value of avoided health decline. A new idea for the PTO
will also be introduced, which is intended to combine
preferences for positive, and avoided negative health
changes. This will be called the "weight for avoided de-
cline" (WAD). As "the coefficient of loss aversion" in Pros-
pect Theory, the WAD is interpreted as the "currency" by
which effects in outcome are weighted and transformed
when perceived as either a loss or a gain [16]. This conver-
sion factor will be used to incorporate people's preferenc-
es in allocating resources among diseased patients
awaiting treatment and healthy persons that could be
saved from decline. Finally, the accuracy of the different
valuation techniques will be assessed by comparing a pri-
oritization ranking of health interventions directly ob-
tained in a hypothetical allocation scenario with rankings
predicted by the different valuation techniques.
A second purpose of the study is to test whether utilities,
elicited by the traditional standard gamble technique
(SG) can be used to appropriately reflect social valuations
of movements between health states and the direction in
which these are experienced, as assumed in common
health economic practice.
Methods
Health states and scaling
Six health states labeled A-F (with increasing severity)
were prepared, which are described in table 3. In a pre-test
with 25 students from the University of Witten/Herdecke,
detailed descriptions of health states covering various
symptoms were used. Extreme variance in the subjective
ranking of health states was observed, e.g. between sexes.
Therefore, it was decided to use very simple and mostly
additive health problems implying an obvious ranking of
health states. The worst health state (F) had to be different
from the conventional absorbing "death"-state. As values
for the same distance between two health states had to be
elicited either experienced as an improvement or as avoid-
ed decline, all health states had to be constructed so that
hypothetical patients could both move into and out of
each health state. Therefore, an irreversible health state
could not be used. In addition to this methodological rea-
son, there is a deeper rationale: Because life and death dif-
fer in their absolute meaning, preferences towards health
care resource allocation involving both categories are like-
ly to follow and mix distinctive ethical rules as if only one
category was concerned. Though health state F might be
perceived as worse than death by respondents, it differs
from the traditional "dead"-state bottom anchor in its
qualitative category, since "worse than death" describes a
point on the quality-of-life continuum, different to the ir-
reversible, "unmodifiable" and final character of death.
For example, the rule of rescue in its narrower sense,
namely the societal duty to save lifes in fatal situations,
applies per se only in cases where the avoidable death of
subjects is involved.
Readers should note this special scaling using a reversible
lower end point because it makes the comparison be-
tween the PTO and SG scores reported herein with those
found using the conventional scale (with death as the bot-
tom anchor) inappropriate.
Questionnaire instrument and valuation procedures
An interactive survey was developed which was published
in the World Wide Web. The survey was written in HTML
and JavaScript. The questionnaire consisted of seven sec-
tions. They are described in some detail to make the read-
er familiar with the analytical steps and valuation
procedures:
1) The first part of the survey introduced all health states
to respondents. Subjects were asked to rank health states
according to their severity. This was intended to make
them familiar with all health states.
2) The conventional standard gamble method (SG) was
presented for health states B to E after explaining the task.
Instead of the usual definition of risk as death from treat-BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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ment, risk in this study was defined as the probability of
moving to health state F. The standard gamble was used as
of two reasons: First, it was expected that the assessment
of health states from a personal perspective would in-
crease reflection and seriousness of participants. Second,
results of the SG task were used to investigate the differ-
ence between personal (SG), and social (PTO) evaluation
of health states. Following common health economic
practice, SG utilities were also used to estimate the value
of avoiding a health state by taking their inverse on the
utility scale. For example, the benefit of avoiding a move
from health state B downwards to health state C would be
calculated as
where   is the utility of not moving from B to C
and U(B) is the utility of being in health state B. Subse-
quently, the accordance of these values with those elicited
by the other techniques was examined.
3) After completion of the four SG questions, respondents
were asked to imagine that they were health authorities
whose task it is to decide which healthcare interventions
to offer to the public. They were explicitly told that their
budget was not sufficient to offer every treatment that
people could benefit from and that they consequently
have to compare and evaluate the benefit of the different
options. It was stated that patients were equal in all other
respects except the described health conditions. The sec-
tion started with a PTO like choice that was only intended
to make subjects familiar with the task and avoid start
point bias [17]. These results were not used in data analy-
sis. The introduction was followed by three PTO sections:
The first contained four pair-wise comparisons between
curative treatments. In the following, this is called PTO-
UP, because choices had to be made between two treat-
ments that offer improvements in health. All patients were
portrayed as suffering from the respective disease and
their health status would not change unless they were pro-
vided the treatment, which would certainly return them to
complete health (state A). The frame used was originally
presented by Pinto Prades [18]: Starting with the PTO task
applied to the worst health state compared to the next best
health state, subsequent comparisons were made between
a health state and the bordering, next best health state. As
illustrated in Figure 1, first the improvement from health
state F to A (arrow 1) was compared to the improvement
from E to A (arrow 2), followed by the comparison be-
tween the gain from health state E to A and D to A (arrow
3) and so on. The advantage of this incremental approach
is that it might be cognitively and morally easier to handle
health states that are not too different from each other.
However, within this approach, additivity of benefits is as-
sumed. Again, to calculate the value of not moving from
B to C, first the value of moving from B to A as compared
to a move from C to A was assessed, which is given by
100 U(C →  A) = x U(B →  A)   (2.1)
(The value of U(C →  A) is known from the previous com-
parisons.) In the next step, the results of (2.1) were then
used to calculate
4) The next section of the survey continued with the same
procedure except that now four PTO choices between pro-
tective interventions for people healthy at present were of-
fered. Respondents were told that people would certainly
fall ill in the near future, if they did not receive the preven-
tive treatment. That is, two avoided downward-move-
ments were presented. For example, first an avoided
decline from health state A to health state F (Fig. 1, arrow
4) was compared to an avoided change from health state
A to health state E (Fig. 1, arrow 5), and this was contin-
ued with adjacent health states. This method is called
PTO-DOWN. The same eliciting procedure as in PTO-UP
was used. The benefit of avoiding a move from B to C was
Table 1: Health states as described in the questionnaire
Health state Description
A) People in this health state are in complete health.
B) People in this health state have problems with the knee joints.
C) People in this health state have problems with the knee joints and suffer from Asthma.
D) People in this health state have problems with the knee joints, suffer from Asthma and are partially sighted.
E) People in this health state suffer from Asthma, are weak sighted and need a wheelchair.
F) People in this health state are completely dependent on others. They suffer extreme pain and are unconscious at times.
UB C UB UC () ( ) ( ) . / →= − () 11
UB C () / →
UB C UC A UB A () () () . / →= →− → () 22BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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calculated as the difference between an avoided move
from A to C and A to B, namely
5) Subsequently, five PTO choices between curative treat-
ments for diseased persons and treatments saving persons
from (further) health decline were presented. While the
distance on the health scale was equal in both options,
they differed in the direction of the potential health effect.
For example, a choice between a treatment which would
return 100 persons in health state F to complete health
was compared with the opportunity to protect X persons
in complete health (state A) from entering health state F
(Fig. 1, arrows 6 and 7). The purpose of this procedure was
to assess directly the rate at which health gains and avoid-
ed losses are traded against each other. This "weight for
avoided decline" (WAD) for the distance between health
states B and C is defined as:
If, for example, participants indicated by their answers,
that they were indifferent between improving the health
of 100 patients from health state C to B and avoiding de-
cline from B to C in 80 persons, then WADB,C = 1.25. The
size of the coefficient and whether it is constant, i.e., inde-
pendent of the reference level, is the focus of interest.
While a WAD higher than 1 indicates that people value
avoiding decline over health improvements, a WAD lower
than 1 implies that respondents prefer the latter to the
former. With a WAD equal to 1, curative and protective
treatments carry the same value, as indirectly assumed
when taking the inverse value of health improvements as
the value of avoided decline. While the size of WAD re-
veals whether individuals favor avoiding decline over
health improving treatments or the opposite, it cannot be
used directly for the comparison of interventions differing
in both, direction and size of a health effect. Whereas an
individual's WAD implies, e.g., preferences for prevention
over cure, these preferences need also be related to health
effects of different magnitude. That is, preferences for
health improvements or avoided decline need to be trad-
ed against their relative size. Such information would be
needed, for example, if a decision maker faces a decision
on whether to fund curative care returning patients in HS
C  t o  c o m p l e t e  h e a l t h  o r  t o  f u n d  p r e v e n t i v e  c a r e  t h a t
avoids decline to HS E in patients currently in HS B. This
makes it necessary to accommodate individuals' prefer-
ences towards curative and preventive effects, measured in
terms of WAD, as a special factor in the conventional
measurement of value. One way to achieve this and make
values for health improvements and avoided decline com-
patible, i.e. quantified on the same scale, is to adjust PTO-
values for the direction in which health changes are expe-
rienced. Since the measurement of value attached to
health improvements (PTO-UP) is more common than
that of avoided health decline (PTO-Down) it was decid-
ed to use PTO-UP values as the "baseline", subject to ad-
justment. The individual-specific mean WAD was
therefore applied as a weight to PTO-UP values. These
weighted PTO-UP values may then be attached to avoided
health changes, while the "raw" PTO-UP values would still
be attached to health improvements. For example, the val-
ue of avoiding a move from health state A to C was calcu-
lated as the value of PTO-UP for the move from C to A,
weighted by the individual-specific mean WAD. These
combined values are indexed "PTO-WAD". To calibrate
the resulting adjusted PTO-values to the 0–1 range, the
PTO-Up values were weighted using a power transforma-
tion.
Thus, a WAD higher than 1 increases the social value of an
avoided health change compared to the "raw" PTO value
for curative treatment effects. If for example, subject's re-
sponses to the PTO-Up procedure reveal that the distance
between health states C and A gained upwards is 0.4, and
this individual's mean WAD is 1.5, which implies a pref-
erence towards preventive care, avoiding a decline from A
to C would be calculated as 0.54. Whether the accuracy of
Figure 1
Illustration of the compared health state movements.
Crossed arrows indicate avoided decline.
Health State PTO-Up PTO-Down WAD
A
(Best)
B
C
D
E
F
(Worst)
1 2 3 4 5 67
UB C UA C UA B () () () . / →= / →− / → () 31
WAD
UC B
xU B C
BC ,
()
()
. =
→
/ → ()
100
41 PTO WAD PTO Up AC CA
WADCA i −= − () / → →
1
42
, .BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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the PTO-Up values in predicting preferences for prioritiza-
tion among curative and preventive interventions can be
improved by weighting them with the WAD, will be ana-
lyzed in the next step.
6) The sixth section presented the direct allocation task
to the subjects. From all 30 possible health changes on
the scale (in both directions), five were randomly cho-
sen from those not presented in the previous three PTO
tasks. These were three curative movements (1) C →  B, (2)
E →  C, (3) F →  B, and two treatments saving from decline
(4)  , (5)  . Subjects were told that they
had a finite budget for the next year as health authorities,
but that they did not yet know how sufficient it was and
which of the presented interventions they could offer to
the public. They were then asked to rank the interven-
tions according to their preferences in giving priority to
patient groups. Results were interpreted such that the in-
tervention ranked first has the highest social value for re-
spondents at an ordinal level. While the absolute size of
the intervals between health states represented by the
five scenarios cannot be derived from this ranking, sever-
al statements on their relative size can be made. For ex-
ample, one would expect (3) F →  B to be ranked higher
than (1) C →  B and (2) E →  C. Consequently, if irrele-
vance of the direction of health change on preferences is
assumed, higher priority would be attached to curative
treatment (3) F →  B as compared to avoiding decline in
(5)   or (4)  , while the improvement (1)
C →  B would rank lower than avoiding the decline in (4)
, and (2) E →  C would have lower priority than
(5)  . To analyze the assumption of equidistances,
the ranking obtained from each individual was investigat-
ed for the number of preference reversals between curative
and preventive treatments. Using the rules on relative size
given above, a reversal was defined as either an avoided
decline that was ranked higher than an improvement of a
greater change (reversal in favor of avoiding decline) or as
an improvement that was attached higher priority than an
avoided decline of larger size (reversal in favor of curative
treatment).
The ordering obtained by the direct ranking task was then
compared with the orderings implied by individuals' re-
sponses to the four valuation techniques (PTO-UP, PTO-
Down, PTO-WAD, SG). On the presumption that the di-
rect ranking task reflects individuals' preferences to prior-
itize among the five scenarios best, the number of 'errors'
found in each of the implied rankings was calculated. An
'erroneous' rank was defined as a mismatch between the
rank a scenario obtained in the direct prioritization task as
compared to the rank the same scenario obtained predict-
ed by the particular valuation technique. The number of
potential errors ranges from 2, in case the ranks of two sce-
narios are reversed in the prediction, to a maximum of 5
in case all ranks are predicted incorrectly. However, not
only the number of errors but also their degree is relevant.
For example, a reversal between two adjacent ranks is less
serious than a reversal between the first and the fourth
rank. Therefore, the degree of incorrect prediction meas-
ured as the absolute sum of deviation in ranks between di-
rect prioritization ranking and predicted ranking,
averaged over all individuals, was also analyzed. The po-
tential absolute sum of deviations in ranks ranges from 2,
in case the ranks of two scenarios are adjacently reversed,
to 12, reflecting the maximum disagreement in orderings.
7) Demographic characteristics such as age, gender and
employment status were asked in the last section of the
questionnaire. In addition, subjects were asked to rate
how difficult they found it to answer the survey's ques-
tions. They were also encouraged to give qualitative com-
ments. A JavaScript function was programmed that
calculated the time respondents needed to complete the
survey starting. The recording of time started with the first
standard gamble task (with the first 'click' performed by
responders) and stopped after the provision of demo-
graphic information (before final qualitative comments).
BD / → CF / →
CF / → BD / →
BD / →
CF / →
Table 2: Examples of search algorithm used in the PTO-tasks
Choice Vote 2. Choice Vote 3. Choice Vote 4. Choice Vote PTO calculation
A B AB AB AB
100 100 A 100 110 A 100 130 A 100 170 Indiff. 100 A = 170 B
100 100 B 100 90 B 100 70 A 100 80 A 100 A = 85 B
100 500* A 100 700 B 100 600 B 100 550 Indiff. 100 A = 550 B
Note: Each row shows a series of hypothetical choices between two interventions A and B that could be offered to the specified number of patients 
each, and responses to the choices. * Arrived at after having consequently voted for A in the preceding choicesBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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The interactive nature of the survey allowed to program
search algorithms in all PTO tasks that were different from
the standard PTO design. Usually, people are asked to give
a number themselves at which they are indifferent between
two treatment options. As reported by others, the pre-test
of this study showed that subjects had difficulties deciding
on and matching precise numbers representing equal so-
cietal value to them [19]. Therefore, it was decided to offer
numbers to respondents, similar to binary choices as in
bidding game techniques. The elicitation procedure start-
ed with a scenario where both interventions could be of-
fered to 100 patients each. Subjects then had to decide for
which of the two treatments they would opt or whether
they were indifferent. Had participants chosen one of the
treatments, the response indicated the direction of ine-
quality, i.e. which intervention was associated with higher
value. Subsequently, a higher number of patients benefit-
ing from the less favored treatment was presented. After
each vote by which the participant indicated an unaffected
direction of inequality, the number offered next was expo-
nentially increased. The algorithm then identified the first
choice where responders changed their preference for one
of the alternatives, e.g. ticked the second treatment after
they had chosen the first previously. The numbers in the
range between this threshold and the preceding number
(covering the point of indifference) were presented in a
ping-pong style, alternating convergent numbers between
high and low depending on the voting behavior. The task
proceeded until subjects were indifferent, when the next
pair-wise comparison was started. Examples of series of
hypothetical choices and responses are given in table 3.
The whole elicitation procedure was facilitated by various
visual aids. For example, in the SG section, a balance was
shown that changed its appearance depending on the risk
the respondent was willing to take (Figure 2). Health
states were explained by written text and small animations
representing the information. In the subsequent sections,
these animations were used to represent health states and
to avoid redundant text and information overload. Writ-
ten information on health states and the tasks was always
accessible by hyperlinks that opened pop-up windows re-
stating the information.
Subjects
A self-selected sample was recruited over the Internet by
indexing the survey's web page in search engines, an-
nouncing it on survey meta-listings and by postings in
German language Usenet groups, such as de.sci.*, de.soc.*
and de.talk.*. Subjects were invited to visit the survey's
webpage. As an incentive, it was announced that those
taking the questionnaire are offered the chance to win a
coupon from an online bookstore worth ~ 10€. By sepa-
rate transmission of responses and email addresses ano-
nymity was guaranteed. The risk that the same person
could provide multiple responses was minimized by
placement of mutually dependent 'cookies'. Cookies are
small files that are written to the users' hard disk by the
Web server when accessing a web page and can be read
and re-written alongside the visit by this server. In the
study, information was written, checked, and tracked in
multiple cookies, referring to each other, when initially
accessing the survey, while proceeding the survey, before
and after successful transmission of responses, as well as
before and after submission of the email-address. The in-
formation was not stored in the usual temporary cookie
folder on the users' hard disk. This programming inhibit-
ed repetitive restarts of the survey by the same user as well
as moving freely through the survey's pages. Multiple sub-
missions of responses were also suppressed. Still, it can-
not be ruled out completely that a person experienced in
web programming with some energy and time might have
been able to manipulate cookies to provide multiple re-
sponses.
Data was analyzed with the statistical package STATA v7
[20].
Results
After 15 days, 129 individuals had completed the survey,
of which 65% were male. The average age was 35 years,
ranging between 19 and 63 years. 87% had tertiary educa-
tion, predominantly in medicine (32%) or economics
(19%), nursing sciences (11%) or psychology (8%). 24%
were currently unemployed or retired and 9% were stu-
dents. The average time needed to complete the survey
was 21 minutes (median: 35). Data of two respondents
had to be removed, as their answers to the PTO-Up choic-
es were obviously not serious. Both subjects indicated that
they were indifferent between a smaller health gain of-
fered to a smaller number of patients and a larger benefit
offered to more patients. 9% of respondents stated that
they found it not difficult, little difficult (39%) or quite
difficult (45%) to answer the questions, and 7% said they
found it very difficult. Analyses of web statistics and ac-
cess-logs show that only few individuals (7) started the
questionnaire and dropped out during progress. All sub-
jects provided the same, "correct" and consistent ranking
of severity of the health states requested in the first task of
the survey.
As shown in figure 3, the differences in mean utility/social
value of health states between the three elicitation tech-
niques are considerable. Values obtained with the "pre-
vention"-PTO method (PTO-Down) are generally higher
than those assessed by the standard "curative treatment"
procedure (PTO-Up). The difference between PTO tech-
niques and SG is substantial and increases with severity of
the health state. It was investigated whether the fixed for-
mat of the successive bids may have provided incentives
to shorten the length of the survey by voting strategicallyBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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and avoiding the ping-pong procedure. If this was true,
one would expect that the fraction of responders taking
the easiest way to do so, namely "opting out" themselves
by choosing the "indifference"-option, would increase
with successive tasks. However, this was not the case. The
number of responders ending a PTO task by clicking the
"indifference"-option ranges between 35 (28%) and 46
(36%) per choice, and these figures are not correlated with
the sequential placement of the respective PTO-choice
among all 13 PTO-choices (Spearman r = -0.09, p = 0.8).
Also, the number of successive bids per PTO-figure does
not decrease with the sequential placement of the respec-
tive PTO-choice among the 4 resp. 5 PTO-choices of each
PTO-task.
The vast majority of responders (69%) preferred the allo-
cation of resources to already diseased patients over
avoidance of the same health state in all five comparisons.
The opposite was true for 2 subjects (2%). 8 responders
(6%) gave equal priority to improvements in health and
avoiding decline in all comparisons. The remaining sub-
jects (23%) favored cure or avoiding decline depending
on the respective health state. There was no significant as-
sociation between sex, employment-status, education or
professional background and preferences towards cure or
avoiding decline. However, respondents that voted in fa-
vor of cure or avoiding decline dependent on the com-
pared health effects were more likely to find the survey
difficult (χ 2 = 21.79, p = 0.01). The mean WAD is nearly
constant for all except health state B, for which it is mod-
erately higher than the WAD's for the other health states
(p = 0.000 compared to WAD for health states C,D,E; p = 0.05
compared WAD for health state F). The size of the WAD val-
ues implies that to be of equal value to responders, a
health decline has to be avoided in twice as many persons
than persons have to experience a health gain of the same
magnitude.
The mean intervals between health states calculated based
on the values elicited by the different techniques and the
substitution rate between avoided downward and gained
upward movements (WAD) are presented in table 3. All
differences between SG and the two PTO techniques are
statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Notably,
differences in size of intervals between health states in-
ferred from the two PTO-tasks increase with severity of
health states.
The number of reversals observed in the direct ranking
task is substantial. Calculated over all subjects, 151 revers-
als occurred in favor of curative treatments, i.e., an im-
provement was ranked higher than an avoided decline of
greater size. In 71 rankings, the treatment that would im-
prove health from C to B was ranked higher than avoiding
decline from health state B to D and 80 individuals at-
tached higher priority to the change from E to C compared
to preventing the decline from C to F. Both reversals were
prevalent in 68 rankings.
9 reversals occurred in favor of prevention. The improve-
ment F →  B was attached less priority than avoided de-
cline from   and   in 5 and 4 cases
respectively. Occurrence of both reversals was observed in
3 rankings. Only 3 reversals occurred among curative
treatments. In all three cases, the improvement E →  C
ranked better than F →  B.
A comparison between the direct ranking task and the
rankings predicted by the four valuation techniques re-
veals considerable deviation in the predicted rankings on
the individual level. Table 4 shows the mean number of
Figure 2
Screenshot of the standard gamble task (translated from the
German original)
Figure 3
Mean utility / social value of health states by elicitation tech-
nique
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"errors" found in each predicted ranking compared to the
direct ranking task. While the PTO-WAD ranking produc-
es on average one reversal among the ranks of two scenar-
ios, the unadjusted rankings implied by participants'
answers to the common PTO-UP procedure show on av-
erage one additional scenario ranked incorrectly. The
mean absolute deviation in ranks between the direct pri-
oritization ranking and the predicted rankings illustrates
that the PTO-WAD not only produces the smallest
number of errors, but also that these errors are less serious
(table 4). The average absolute deviation of two ranks sug-
gests that the PTO-WAD produces one adjacent reversal of
two scenarios compared to the direct ranking. The superi-
ority of the PTO-WAD technique compared to the other
valuation techniques on the aggregate level can be mainly
attributed to the fact that it reproduces a considerable frac-
tion of the reversals observed in the direct ranking task.
49% of the reversals between curative and preventive
treatments reported about above were exactly replicated
by the PTO-WAD technique.
A considerable fraction of participants provided detailed
and serious qualitative comments on the content level.
These comments were discussing mainly (1) reasons un-
derlying their choices in favor of curative or preventive
healthcare, (2) issues of translating their choices into prac-
tice, which was mainly expressed by participants with a
professional healthcare background, and (3) general is-
sues of priority setting, health care policy and the German
health care system. Surprisingly, several healthcare profes-
sionals stated, that they appreciate the presentation of the
resource allocation problems and the opportunity to
transmit their views anonymously as "...these are the issues
we have to face and we should aim to honestly and openly dis-
cuss them".
Discussion
This study used an interactive web-based questionnaire to
examine preferences towards improvements in health and
avoidance of decline in a healthcare resource allocation
context using a self-selected sample. All four preference
elicitation techniques gave results of high internal consist-
ency within and between subjects. This is especially sur-
prising for the direct ranking and the PTO-tasks, since they
were cognitively demanding. On the methodological lev-
el, this may be explained by the mode PTO choices were
presented. Responders were confronted with numbers as
in bidding games, which might be easier to handle than to
match them "freehand". Another explanation is that the
health scale used did not include the conventional
"death"-state and therefore all interventions were equal
with respect to the fact that ethical principles and prefer-
ences regarding life-saving treatments, such as the rule of
rescue, were not involved. As the values obtained by the
new PTO-Down method suggest, the same allocation
preferences seem to underlie rationing choices regarding
preventive interventions and curative treatments each
evaluated among each other. Health effects of greater
magnitude, gained upwards or avoided downwards, con-
tributed to higher value. However, it is unclear for both
types of health directions whether it is the size of health
effect or the severity of initial, or avoided health state that
was the main rationing criteria for responders. Unfortu-
nately, the construction of the PTO choices does not allow
decomposition of these factors.
Contrary to the study by Ubel et al., which reports moder-
ate preferences for preventive over curative treatments
[12], responders to the present study strongly favored im-
proving hypothetical patients' health compared to avoid-
ing decline. The prioritization of curative treatments was
present both in the person trade-off procedure as well as
in the direct ranking task (represented by the high number
of reversals in favor of cure). This is surprising since the
onset of disease was defined as a certain event in the near
future. It is likely that the value people place on preventive
as compared to curative treatments diminishes as the ex-
tent of uncertainty and time to disease onset increase. One
Table 3: Mean intervals and WAD for movements between health states
Mean interval between health states
Health states SG§ [95% CI] PTO-Down ° [95% CI] PTO-Up$ [95% CI] WAD* [95% CI]
A–B 0.0875 [0.0637–0.1113] 0.0480 [0.0223–0.0736] 0.0502 [0.0304–0.0700] 0.6443 [0.5811–0.7075]
A–C 0.2056 [0.1836–0.2276] 0.0778 [0.0488–0.1069] 0.1032 [0.0716–0.1348] 0.5248 [0.4616–0.5873]
A–D 0.4015 [0.3738–0.4292] 0.1484 [0.1111–0.1857] 0.1857 [0.1389–0.2325] 0.4748 [0.4066–0.5431]
A–E 0.5658 [0.5354–0.5961] 0.2977 [0.2487–0.3467] 0.3694 [0.3112–0.4277] 0.4919 [0.3951–0.5888]
A–F 1 -- 1 -- 1 -- 0.5167 [0.3542–0.6791]
N = 127 Results of paired t-tests: §Significant different to PTO-Up at 1% or better; ° Significant different to SG at 1% or better; $Significant different 
to PTO-Down at 1% or better for A – E, at 10% for A – D and A – C; *WAD values were calculated as described in eq. 4.1 (section 5) of the study 
designBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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explanation for the apparent discrepancy in results may be
the different framing of questions. Ubel et al. presented
the task as choices among different "new projects" of
which a fixed number of nursing home residents could
benefit from, i.e., on the program, rather than on the indi-
vidual patient level. Contrary, in this study, participants
were confronted with choices among treatments that
could be offered to a varying number of patients. In addi-
tion, the SG tasks in which participants were asked to im-
agine themselves suffering from the health states preceded
the rationing choices. The presence of suffering or need in
terms of actual manifestation of the disease could have
caused subjects to focus patients' situation and to place
more value on curative treatment, even if the distance be-
tween health states is considerably smaller. This interpre-
tation is strengthened by the qualitative comments
provided by participants of the present study. A reasona-
ble fraction argued "...it is cruel to deny treatment to those
suffering with reference to the fact that resources are reserved
to save others from entering this situation. What are patients
left to expect from health care then?". Other qualitative com-
ments suggest, that preferences for improving patients'
health rather than avoiding decline might in part be
caused by fairness concerns. Several responders stated
considerations such as: "It is some form of luxury to prevent
a disease as long as there are people already suffering the same
disease, and as long as it can be treated". Spending resources
on already suffering persons first and accepting others get-
ting seriously ill, which might then be prioritized against
others again, equalizes each individuals' chances to ob-
tain appropriate treatment. Preferring avoidance of de-
cline over improving patients' health in resource
allocation, on the other hand, would increase inequality
between those remaining ill and those fortunate to profit
from treatment before suffering.
However, participants' preferences towards curative treat-
ments were not absolute. As both, results from the com-
bined PTO-WAD technique as well as the direct
prioritization ranking, show, a vast majority was willing
to trade their preference towards cure against a larger
number of patients that could be saved from decline. The
basic idea of quantifying this relation between equally
sized effects of different directions and applying this value
as a weight for avoided health decline in comparisons be-
tween curative and preventive treatments proved feasible
and has led to a substantial improvement in predicting in-
dividuals' rationing decisions concerning curative and
preventive treatments. However, using the individual-spe-
cific mean as a weight may be a too rough estimate since
a reasonable fraction of responders made their choices for
or against curative treatments dependent of the health
states involved in the PTO-WAD comparisons. Other,
more complex weighting functions may produce even bet-
ter results. Optimally, one could use (traditional) PTO-Up
values to evaluate the benefit of curative treatments, PTO-
Down values for the assessment of interventions avoiding
decline, and the weighting technique for choices involv-
ing both types of interventions.
The inferior performance of the SG in predicting individ-
uals' rationing choices as compared to the PTO proce-
dures, at least at the ordinal level, is not surprising since
Pinto and others report similar results [18,21,22]. One
could argue that it is not reasonable to expect that SG util-
ities would accurately predict societal rationing choices
among preventive and curative treatments, since this is
not what they are intended to measure. While this is of
course true, it is exactly what is done in health economic
evaluation and it is the purpose of the study to question
this practice by presenting the disagreement between SG,
PTO and the direct prioritization ranking. For example, re-
cently Zaric and Brandeau developed a resource allocation
model for HIV prevention programs [23]. The calculation
of potential gain in QALYs of preventing HIV infection
was based on utilities attached to HIV associated health
states by HIV-infected patients. In addition to the prob-
lem of personal versus social valuation of health states,
this approach assumes that society would attach the same
value to avoiding and leaving HIV-associated health
states.
The study has several limitations and weaknesses. A main
limitation is the small sample, which is highly biased to-
Table 4: Mean and median number of errors and absolute rank deviation in the predicted rankings by elicitation technique
SG PTO-Down PTO-Up PTO-WAD
Mean number of errors 3.0 2.7 2.7 1.9
Median 4 4 4 2
Mean absolute deviation in ranks 3.9 3.0 3.0 2.1
Median 4 4 4 2
N = 127BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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wards the well-educated and those using the Internet. In
addition to the traditional self-selection bias common to
online-research, the current study is also characterized by
a strong overrepresentation of participants with a medical
background. This bias is likely to result in part from the
chosen newsgroups, in which the survey was announced
and might be reduced by a more wide-spread invitation
strategy. However, the main aim of the study was to intro-
duce a technique for the joint valuation of health effects
experienced in different directions and to examine its in-
ternal consistency with a direct prioritization task, rather
than to yield representative figures. The unconventional
scaling of health states, the presentation of the PTO ques-
tions as bidding games and the heavy demand on cogni-
tive capabilities during the ranking task highlight the
experimental character of the study. In addition, the PTO
tasks did not provide information on the preceding dura-
tion of illness of hypothetical patients. Some of the health
states used might have been recognized as congenital dis-
abilities, which is likely to introduce particular bias. Also,
preferences towards curative treatments might in part re-
sult from uncertainty or discounting future outcomes.
Though both curative and protective actions were de-
scribed as having certain and immediate effects, subjects
might have intuitively perceived the latter as less certain or
subject to a time shift, or even questioned the credibility
of this description, since preventive programs with "cer-
tain effects in the near future" are scarce. Contrary, cura-
tive treatments might have been perceived as more
harmful or associated with side effects, which would have
introduced a bias towards prioritization of avoiding dete-
rioration. A serious concern is the additive definition of
three health states. Whereas they may fit an additive
scheme of cure of each condition, an additive scheme of
prevention may have been seriously doubted by partici-
pants. Realism would have introduced a strong bias in fa-
vor of cure. One would then expect individuals with a
healthcare professional background being most sensitive
to this issue. However, no "knowledge effect", in terms of
association between professional background and prefer-
ences towards cure or avoidance of decline was observed.
Finally, the observed strong preferences towards cure
might also be explained by the fact, that – traditionally –
the healthcare budget is perceived to produce above all
treatment and cure for diseased patients. Again, this po-
tential bias might be even more serious taking the high
fraction of medical professionals into account, that can be
expected to be for the most part practicing and experienc-
ing curative care. On the other hand however, targeting
and moving resources to preventive care is often claimed
by public opinion and the medical profession. Preventive
programs often rank very high in priority setting lists [24].
As Ubel et al. point out, such attitudes might be based on
the belief, that it only needs "an ounce of prevention to
bring large benefits" [12]. As in the present study effects of
avoiding decline and opportunity costs in terms of fore-
gone curative effects were quantified and directly compa-
rable, however, pro-preventive attitudes might have been
altered.
There are also a number of methodological concerns. The
fact that all PTO-choices started with the compared treat-
ments offered to 100 patients each may have introduced
bias from anchoring effects (starting-point bias) [25,26].
Though anchoring responses at 100/100 might have led
to a systematic underestimation of participants' "true"
PTO-values, this should not have affected their relative
size or their relation to the direct ranking task. More gen-
erally, the PTO may be susceptible to order effects which
may in part explain the differences between the PTO-Up
and PTO-Down results [19]. A major concern is that the
PTO-WAD technique, which was used to directly evaluate
the value of health improvements compared to avoided
decline of the same magnitude might have introduced
and mixed action, status-quo and omission biases [27].
To explain results, action bias must be strong enough to
overcome status-quo and loss omission bias, both of
which suggest that more participants opt for avoiding de-
cline, as this keeps the current situation unchanged for all
patients and the decision maker cannot be held responsi-
ble for health deterioration. Patt and Zeckhauser observed
such strong action bias in some individuals in experimen-
tal studies involving environmental decisions though
[28]. Finally, one could be concerned with the level of en-
gagement and reflection of responders in the presented
numerical exercises. Given that participants are not forced
to deliberation, they might present quick and unreflective
answers, not necessarily consistent with their deeper val-
ues. The high number of thoughtful and serious qualita-
tive comments, the observed internal consistency in the
PTO-tasks, and between PTO-WAD and direct prioritiza-
tion ranking indicate that subjects were not responding
haphazardly and made considered choices. Also the small
number of reversals among curative treatments observed
in the ranking task compared to those found among cura-
tive and preventive treatments indicate that these may re-
flect "true values" rather than resulting from ill judgment.
Conversely, there is no objective and direct evidence on
the involvement of participants and the rationales under-
lying their choices.
Despite these limitations, the results of this study, howev-
er, suggest that the utility of being cured of a given health
state might not be a good approximation for the societal
value of avoiding this health state, especially in cases of
competition between preventive and curative interven-
tions.BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/2/3
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Conclusions
Participants strongly prioritized improving patients'
health rather than avoiding (further) decline. Weighting
PTO values according to the direction in which changes in
health are experienced improved their accuracy in predict-
ing a direct prioritization ranking. This study also adds to
the existing evidence that health state utilities obtained by
the standard gamble method do not reflect social values
in resource allocation contexts.
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